Jaffee v. Redmond: The Supreme Court Recognizes the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Federal Courts and Expands the Privilege to Include Social Workers by Gunter, Jason L.
Nova Law Review
Volume 21, Issue 2 1997 Article 6
Jaffee v. Redmond: The Supreme Court
Recognizes the Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege in the Federal Courts and Expands
the Privilege to Include Social Workers
Jason L. Gunter∗
∗
Copyright c©1997 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
Jaffee v. Redmond: The Supreme Court Recognizes the
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Federal Courts and
Expands the Privilege to Include Social Workers
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 719
II. THE HISTORY OF JAFFEE V. REDMOND ......................................... 722
A. Facts of the Case ................................................................. 722
B. Procedural History ............................................................. 724
C. Analysis of the Seventh Circuit Decision ............................ 724
mH. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION .................................................. 726
A. Plaintiffs'Argument Before the Supreme Court ................. 726
B. Defendants'Argument Before the Supreme Court ............. 727
C. The Majority Opinion ......................................................... 729
D. The Dissenting Opinion ...................................................... 731
E. Analysis of Jaffee v. Redmond ............................................ 732
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 738
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent landmark decision of Jaffee v. Redmond,1 the United States
Supreme Court announced that confidential communications by a patient to a
psychotherapist are absolutely privileged. 2 Furthermore, the Court held that
confidential communications by a party to a social worker are within the
bounds of this psychotherapist-patient privilege.3 This comment examines
the Court's decision in Jaffee, focusing on the respective strengths and
weaknesses of the reasoning employed by the majority and the dissent.
Specifically, it is this author's position that the majority's decision in Jaffee
is sound, well-reasoned, and based on the realities of our current social
climate. On the other hand, Justice Scalia's dissent is ill-conceived, illogi-
cal, dogmatic, and flies in the face of common sense and reason.
1. 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996).
2. Id. at 1931.
3. Id.
1
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The Supreme Court has consistently been reluctant to create new
evidentiary privileges or to expand existing privileges. 4 The general ration-
ale the Court has used for refusing to recognize or expand privileges is that
to do so is to exclude relevant evidence from the trier of fact.5 In other
words, in a search for the truth, the public has a right to all relevant evi-
dence.6 Only when the public need for an evidentiary privilege substantially
outweighs the ordinary truth finding process will the Court deviate from this
rationale.
7
In Trammel v. United States,8 the Supreme Court demonstrated its
narrow view toward evidentiary privileges by cutting back the scope of the
spousal immunity privilege, holding that only the testifying spouse could
assert the privilege.9
The federal courts' authority to recognize new privileges is derived
from Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.'0 When the rules regarding
privileges were proposed, the drafters incorporated several common law
privileges, including a psychotherapist-patient privilege." However,
4. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980); United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,485-86 (1948).
5. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (stating that evidentiary privileges
usurp the fundamental truth finding process). See generally CHARLES TLFORD MCCORMICK,
McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72 (5th ed. 1992) (discussing the effects of the rules of
privileges upon the judicial process).
6. Bryan, 339 U.S. at 331 (citation omitted).
7. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708-10.
8. 445 U.S. 40 (1980). Trammel was charged with conspiracy to import heroin into the
United States. Id. at 42. Trammel's wife was called to testify on behalf of the government in
order to implicate her husband. Id. at 42-43. Trammel sought to invoke the spousal
immunity privilege in an attempt to have his wife's testimony excluded. Id. at 42.
9. Id. at 53.
10. FED. R. EVID. 501. This rule provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided
by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to
statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or po-
litical subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law
as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an
element of a claim or defense as to which state law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or political subdivision
thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
Id.
11. See Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
240-41 (1972). The Supreme Court proposed 10 privileges including a proposed psycho-
therapist-patient privilege. Id. at 230-58.
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Congress rejected a rigid adoption of privileges, and instead, adopted a
general rule giving the federal courts discretion to create new privileges.
12
The cornerstone of the Supreme Court's decision in Jaffee was rule
501.13 In Jaffee, two important issues were presented. 4 One was whether
the Supreme Court should formally recognize the psychotherapist-patient
privilege under its powers granted by rule 501,15 and two, if such a privilege
were to be recognized, whether the privilege should extend to social workers
as well as to psychotherapists and clinical psychologists. 6 Some federal
courts had previously recognized the psychotherapist-patient privilege at the
time Jaffee came before the Supreme Court for review. 17 However, there
was still considerable disagreement among the circuits as to whether the
privilege should be recognized at all.18  Moreover, prior to Jaffee, even
where the psychotherapist-patient privilege did exist, various federal courts
held conflicting views regarding the scope of the privilege.'9 Therefore,
when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jaffee,20 the issue of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege in the federal courts cried out for resolu-
tion.
The issues presented in Jaffee are important ones to our society, given
that many people in our population need therapy in some context or another,
at some point in their lives. Complete and candid disclosure is at the heart of
the relationship between patient and psychotherapist. 21  The Supreme
Court's decision in Jaffee will have a significant impact on this relationship,
for it will foster open communication between patient and therapist.
12. See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, ch. 157, 88 Stat. 1926 (adopting the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, but excluding proposed rule 504 containing 10 specific common law privileges, among
which was the psychotherapist-patient privilege).
13. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1927; see also FED. R. EvID. 501.
14. Id. at 1925.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325, 1328 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632,
639 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is recognized by the
federal courts).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir. 1994); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to recognize a psychotherapist-
patient privilege). See generally Bruce J. Winick, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: A
Therapeutic Jurisprudence View, 50 U. MiAmi L. REV. 249 (1996) (discussing the general
disagreement in the federal system regarding the privilege).
19. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1939.
20. Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 334
(1995).
21. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928.
1997]
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Without access to all of the "pieces to the puzzle," mental health profession-
als are impeded in their quest first to understand and then to help the
patient.22 The logical end result of the Court's failure to recognize the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, or to give it any significant breadth, can
only be that the full and honest disclosure, so vital to a successful course of
therapy, would be chilled.23 Thus, the Jaffee decision is extremely signifi-
cant because it will affect patients who see mental health professionals of all
kinds, despite whether or not these patients go on to become litigants. It will
bear upon the course of therapy indicated and provided by those profession-
als and it will surely influence the way lawyers try cases, as well as the
nature and extent of evidence that juries get to see. Indeed, the Jaffee
decision will affect the very outcome of some cases.
II. THE HISTORY OF JAFFEE V. REDMOND
A. Facts of the Case
On June 27, 1991, Officer Mary Lu Redmond was dispatched to a
"'fight in progress"' taking place at an apartment complex in her jurisdic-
tion.24 Upon arrival, Officer Redmond was greeted at her squad car by two
frantic individuals shouting that there had been a stabbing.2 After calling
for backup, Officer Redmond exited her squad car and proceeded to walk
toward the apartment complex.26 As Redmond approached the structure,
several men ran from the building, one of whom was waving a metal pipe. 7
Officer Redmond ordered the men to the ground, and upon their refusal drew
her weapon. 28 A moment later, two additional men burst from the building
29
Although the facts are in dispute,30 according to Officer Redmond, one of
22. Id. See also Brief for American Psychiatric Association at *12-17, Jaffee v. Red-
mond, No. 95-266, 1995 WL 767892 (U.S. Dec. 29, 1995) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
23. Id. at *14.
24. Brief for Petitioner at *3, Jaffee v. Redmond, No. 95-266, 1995 WL 723662 (U.S.
Nov. 30, 1995).
25. Id. at *4. The two individuals turned out to be relatives of the decedent Ricky Allen
and would later testify against Officer Redmond at trial. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Brief for Petitioner at *4.
29. Id.
30. The siblings of the Ricky Allen related a story that conflicted with Officer Redmond's
version of the events. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1349. For example, there was conflicting testimony
regarding what point in time Officer Redmond drew her weapon. Id.
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those men, Picky Allen, was brandishing a butcher knife while in pursuit of
another man.31 Despite Officer Redmond's repeated commands for Allen to
drop the weapon and get to the ground, he continued in pursuit.32 Finally,
when Officer Redmond believed Allen was about to stab the man he was
chasing, Redmond fired her service revolver, striking Allen. 33 Allen was
pronounced dead at the scene by emergency personnel.34
Picky Allen's surviving family members sued Officer Redmond and her
employer, the Village of Hoffman Estates, in federal court for civil rights
violations and wrongful death.35 During discovery, the plaintiffs learned that
Officer Redmond had attended numerous counseling sessions with a clinical
social worker named Karen Beyer.36 The plaintiffs attempted to discover the
content of the counseling sessions between Redmond and Beyer to use as
substantive evidence during the trial.37 The defendants objected to discovery
of the sessions between Redmond and Beyer, asserting that the communica-
tions were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege.38  The trial
court rejected the defendants' argument that the conversations were privi-
leged and ordered discovery of Beyer's notes of the conversations.39
The trial court's order was never fully complied with by Officer
Redmond or Karen Beyer.4° During depositions and at trial, Redmond and
Beyer either refused to answer certain questions or were entirely evasive. 41
Ultimately, over the defendants' objection, the trial judge instructed the
jury that the refusal to reveal the notes was not legally justified and that the
jury could presume that the subject matter of the conversations would have
been unfavorable to Officer Redmond and her employer, the Village of
31. Brief for Petitioner at *4.
32. Id
33. IM
34. Id at *5.
35. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1348. Ricky Allen's survivors sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and the State of Illinois' wrongful death statute. Id.
36. Brief for Petitioner at *5.
37. Id. at *5-6.
38. Id. at *6.
39. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1350-51. The district court judge determined that federal law
rather than state law governed the privilege issue. Id. In doing so, the judge relied on
proposed rule of evidence 504 and held that the rule did not extend to social workers. Id. at
1350 n.5.
40. Id. at 1351. See also Brief for Petitioner at *8.
41. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1351. Karen Beyer refused to hand over her notes of the counseling
sessions and provided limited answers regarding Officer Redmond's version of the shooting.
Id. Additionally, Officer Redmond, both at her deposition and during trial, responded "'I
don't recall"' numerous times. Id.
1997]
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Hoffman Estates. 42 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs and judg-
ment was entered in favor of Allen's estate.43
B. Procedural History
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the trial court committed prejudicial error by compelling discovery of the
notes and giving the adverse jury instruction.44 Specifically, the court held
that the conversations between Redmond and Beyer were protected by the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, and therefore, were inadmissible.45
The court of appeals reasoned that the law of privileges could be
expanded by the federal courts in accordance with the Federal Rules of
Evidence.46 Furthermore, the rules call for recognition of a psychotherapist-
patient privilege.47 The court stated that the privilege is not absolute but
rather is a qualified privilege. In each case, the need for the privilege must
be balanced against the need to ascertain the truth through the introduction
of all relevant evidence at trial.
48
In the instant case, the need for private communications between a
psychotherapist and her patient outweighed the plaintiffs need for the
evidence. 49 Hence, the court concluded that the jury instruction, which
allowed the jury to draw an adverse inference against Officer Redmond and
the Village of Hoffman Estates, constituted prejudicial error.5°
C. Analysis of the Seventh Circuit Decision
The majority used rule 501 as the foundation for its decision.5 1 First,
the court stated that reason dictates the recognition of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege in the federal courts. 52 The court's rationale here was that
public policy mandates the existence of the privilege.53 Mental health is of
42. Id. at 1351 n.9.
43. Id. at 1352.
44. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1358.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1354 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)). See also supra
note 10.
47. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1355-56.
48. Id. at 1357.
49. Iet at 1357-58.
50. Id. at 1358.
51. Id. at 1357.
52. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1356-57.
53. Id
[Vol. 21:719
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great importance in our society and essential to mental health is open and
candid communication between a psychotherapist and her patient.54 Second,
experience dictates that the privilege should be recognized, since some form
of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is recognized in all fifty states.5
However, as noted, the Seventh Circuit did not rule that the privilege
was absolute. 6 Rather, the court held that the privilege is qualified and must
be balanced against the need to find the truth during the judicial process.
In balancing these two competing interests, the court reasoned that without
the privilege, communications between a psychotherapist and her patient
would be chilled. 8 Most significantly, the court observed that the need for
open communications is essential for effective psychotherapy.5 9
On the other hand, the court noted that although the conversations
between Officer Redmond and Karen Beyer were relevant to the substantive
issues of the plaintiffs' case, the plaintiffs had alternative evidence which
was just as effective. 60
54. Id. at 1355-57.
55. Id. at 1356. See also ALA. CODE § 34-26-2 (1975); ALASKA R. EVID. 504; ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2085 (1992); ARK. R. EVID. 503; CAL EVID. CODE ANN. § 1010
(1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(g)(1) (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146c (1995);
DEL UNIF. R. EVID. 503; D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 90.503 (West
1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-21 (1995); HAW. R. EVID. 504; IDAHO R. EVID. 503; ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 225 § 15.5 (1994); IND. CODE § 25-33-1-17 (1993); IOWA CODE § 622.10
(1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5323 (1985); KY. R. EVID. 507; LA. CODE EVID. ANN., art.
510 (West 1995); ME. R. EVID. 503; MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-109 (1995); MASS. GEN.
L. § 233:20B (1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.18237 (West 1996); MINN. STAT.
ANN § 595.02 (West 1996); MISS. R. EVID. 503; MO. REV. STAT. § 491.060 (1994); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 26-1-807 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 49.209 (Michie 1996); N.H. R. EVID. 503; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14B-28 (West 1995);
N.M. R. EVID. 504; N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 4507 (MeKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
8-53.3 (1995); N.D. R. EVID. 503; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (1995); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 12 § 2503 (1991); OR. R. EVID. 504.1; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5944 (1982); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 5-37.3-3 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-95 (Law. Co-op. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 19-13-6 to 19-13-11 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-207 (1980); TEX. R.
CIV. EViD. 509, 510; UTAH R. EVlD. 506; VT. R. EVID. 503; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400.2
(1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 18.83.110 (1994); W. VA. CODE § 27-3-1 (1992); WIS. STAT.
§ 905.04 (1994); WYO. STAT. § 33-27-123 (1995).
56. Jaffee, 51 F.3d at 1357.
57. Id. at 1357-58.
58. Il
59. Id.
60. Id. There were several eyewitnesses who testified on behalf of the plaintiff. Jaffee,
51 F.3d at 1357-58. The testimony of these eyewitness accounts could possibly be used to
test Officer Redmond's credibility just as effectively as Beyer's notes from the counseling
7
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Accordingly, the court concluded that the need for the subject matter of
the conversations as evidence was outweighed by the public's need for the
psychotherapist-patient privilege.6'
Il. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. Plaintiffs' Argument Before the Supreme Court
The plaintiffs argued that, in light of the Court's cautious approach to
the creation of new privileges, the costs of the psychotherapist-patient
privilege outweighed any benefits that might be received by recognizing the
privilege.
62
First, the plaintiffs contended that the cost of a psychotherapist-patient
privilege would be substantial.63 The plaintiffs argued that since therapists,
unlike lawyers, are not officers of the court, they have no real legitimate
interest in the search for the truth. 64 Accordingly, there is a real danger that
a therapist may help to generate inconsistent recollections of a particular
incident through therapy.65 Moreover, the plaintiffs contended that to allow
such a broad privilege as was adopted by the appellate court would keep
highly relevant evidence from the jury.66  This case turned on Officer
Redmond's credibility, the plaintiffs argued, and to allow the privilege
would significantly hinder the plaintiffs' attempt to impeach her credibil-
ity.
67
Second, according to the plaintiffs, the benefits of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege are unclear and speculative at best.68  The plaintiffs in
Jaffee contended that there is no real science to prove that the absence of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege would chill effective psychotherapy, as was
urged by the appellate court and the defendants.
69
Third, the plaintiffs further argued that there is no indication that the
experience of the common law calls for an adoption of the psychotherapist-
sessions. Id. at 1358. Moreover, Officer Redmond herself testified at trial and was available
for cross examination. Id.
61. Id.
62. Brief for Petitioner at * 12.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at *21-22.
67. Brief for Petitioner at *21. The plaintiffs alleged that Officer Redmond's memory of
the events surrounding the incident became clearer and more self-serving as time passed. Id.
68. Id. at *26.
69. Id. at *26-27.
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patient privilege in the federal courts. 70 They observed that although all fifty
states have adopted some form of the privilege,71 no state has adopted a
privilege as broad as that urged by the appellate court.7 2
Fourth, the plaintiffs pointed out that state laws which recognize a
privilege between a psychotherapist and her patient are inconsistent as to the
scope of the privilege.73 This is evidenced by the fact that the state laws are
littered with exceptions.74 Furthermore, the plaintiffs pointed out that nine
states do not recognize any evidentiary privilege between a social worker
and her patient.75
Finally, the plaintiffs contended that if the Court were to recognize an
evidentiary privilege between a psychotherapist and patient, the Court
should not expand that privilege of confidentiality to social workers.76 Here,
the plaintiffs relied on the psychotherapist-patient privilege proposed by the
Federal Rules of Evidence.77  Proposed rule 504 speaks only of a
"psychotherapist" and makes no mention of the term "social worker.
'78
Hence, plaintiffs argued, Congress did not intend that the privilege extend to
social workers as well as psychotherapists.79
B. Defendants' Argument Before the Supreme Court
The defendants argued that not only should there be a psychotherapist-
patient privilege but that the privilege should extend to social workers as
well.80 The defendants asserted that the decision by the Seventh Circuit was
harmonious with rule 501, as well as with the congressional intent behind
the rule.81 The defendants further contended that under rule 501 both reason
and experience dictate the creation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 2
70. Id. at *31.
71. See statutes cited supra note 55.
72. Brief for Petitioner at *31.
73. Id. at *37.
74. Id. at *31-33.
75. Id. at *35 n.66.
76. Id. at *39.
77. Brief for Petitioner at *39-40. See also Rules of Evidence for United States Courts
and Magistrates, supra note 11, at 240-41 (proposing rule 504 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence).
78. Brief for Petitioner at *39.
79. Id.
80. Brief for Respondent at *11, Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d (7th Cir. 1995) (No. 95-
266).
81. Id. at *9.
82. Id. at *9-10.
1997]
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As for reason, the defendants relied heavily on the public policy underlying
the privilege. Like the court of appeals, the defendants pointed out that
psychotherapy serves a very important interest in our society. The premise
here is that society encourages its citizens to seek mental health assistance
freely and openly.84 Essential to these sessions is the confidentiality be-
tween the patient and therapist.85 Without confidentiality, citizens would be
reluctant to candidly disclose crucial information needed to assure effective
counseling.86 This is especially true with regard to police officers.87 Police
officers such as Mary Lu Redmond are subjected to stressful situations in the
line of duty on a daily basis.88 Many times, officers will need to seek
counseling in regard to specific incidents that occur while on duty, as did
Officer Redmond in this case.89 Critical to an officer's mental health is the
need for that officer to reveal the facts surrounding the incident without fear
that his or her communications will be disclosed to third parties.90 There-
fore, argued the defendants, in order for there to be effective therapy for a
police officer or an ordinary citizen, the courts must assure the patient
confidentiality at all cost.91
The defendants also contended that experience requires the Court to
adopt the psychotherapist-patient privilege,92 noting that all fifty states have
adopted some form of the psychotherapist-patient privilege.93 The defen-
dants responded to the plaintiffs by pointing out that although some states do
have exceptions to the privilege, it is not logical to reject entirely the
psychotherapist-patient privilege for this reason.94
Moreover, the defendants urged that the privilege should apply to
clinical social workers, such as Karen Beyer, as well as to psychothera-
83. Id. See generally Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical
Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 175, 184-85 (1960).
84. Brief for Respondent at *22.
85. Id. at *22-23.
86. Id. at *23. See generally Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege
Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. REV.
893 (1982) (discussing the importance of confidentiality for effective treatment of mental
health).
87. Brief for Respondent at *20.
88. Id.
89. Id. at * 19-20.
90. Ide at *20.
91. Id. at *22.
92. Brief for Respondent at *28-29.
93. See statutes cited supra note 55.
94. Brief for Respondent at *30.
[Vol. 21:719
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pists.95 In rebuttal to the plaintiffs' argument in regard to proposed rule 504,
the defendants pointed out that at the time Congress drafted rule 504, the
social work profession was in "early adolescence." 96 However, since that
time, the social worker has become prevalent in the field of mental health.97
This is especially true since many people who cannot afford a psychologist
or psychiatrist will often seek out the help of a social worker at a lesser
expense.98 In light of the social worker's increased role in the field of
mental health, it would be unfair to allow the privilege for psychotherapists
and not social workers.99
Finally, agreeing with the court of appeals, the defendants conceded
that the privilege was not absolute.' In every case, in order for the privi-
lege to apply, the need for confidential communications between a psycho-
therapist and patient must be outweighed by the desire to include all relevant
evidence at trial.101 In this case, the appellate court concluded, the plaintiffs
had alternative evidence which would have served the same purpose as the
notes of Karen Beyer.Ic 2 Specifically, numerous eyewitness accounts of the
shooting were used to impeach Officer Redmond's testimony.103 Con-
versely, as indicated, Officer Redmond's need to have her conversations
protected are essential to her work as a police officer.1 4 Hence, the defen-
dants concluded that the Court should affirm the decision of the appellate
court. 10 5
C. The Majority Opinion
As it had been for the appellate court, the framework for the Supreme
Court's decision in Jaffee was the Federal Rules of Evidence.1 6 The Court
reasoned that rule 501 was not intended to freeze the law of privileges but
95. Id
96. Id. at *30-31.
97. Id. at *31.
98. Id.
99. Brief for Respondent at *32.
100. Id at *12.
101. Id
102. Id. at *35-37.
103. Id. at *37.
104. Brief for Respondent at *35-36.
105. Id.
106. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1925.
1997]
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rather to encourage the federal courts to continue to develop evidentiary
privileges in light of reason and experience. 10 7
First, the majority conceded that past decisions indicated there should
be a strong presumption against creating new evidentiary privileges. 08
However, the Court noted that new privileges can be justified by "'public
good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all
rational means for ascertaining the truth." ' 10 9
Like the appellate court, the majority relied heavily on public policy. 0
The Court stated that like other privileges that have been adopted at common
law, the psychotherapist-patient privilege is "'rooted in the imperative need
for confidence and trust."'"1" The majority concurred with the defendants'
proposition that like the attorney-client privilege, effective therapy depends
on open and candid communications.1
2
The Supreme Court also adopted the defendants' view, and that of the
court of appeals, that experience mandates the creation of the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege." 3 The fact that the states have unanimously agreed
that some form of the privilege should exist strongly suggests that experi-
ence with the privilege has been positive."
14
The majority also ruled the privilege should apply to clinical social
workers as well as psychotherapists." 5 Again, the rationale for extending
the parameters of the privilege was that the privilege would not serve its
purpose to society if not extended to social workers."
6
Up until this point, the majority was in agreement with the court of
appeals ruling; however, the majority did not agree with the appellate court's
finding that the privilege should be a qualified one." 7 The Court expressed
that the privilege would be undermined if judges were to subject the privi-
lege to a balancing test in each and every case as the appellate court had
suggested. 1 8 In order for the privilege to be effective, the parties to the
107. Id. at 1927.
108. Id. at 1928.
109. Id. (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960)).
110. Id. at 1929.
111. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51
(1980)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1930.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1931.
116. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct at 1931.
117. Id. at 1932.
118. Id.
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conversation "'must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether
particular discussions will be protected."' 1 19 The Court concluded, however,
that there was no need to develop the full scope of the privilege nor would it
be feasible to do so here and left that for future courts to decide. 20
D. The Dissenting Opinion
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Scalia accused the majority of having
incorrectly framed the main issue.121 Most of the majority opinion was
devoted to the question of whether the federal courts should, generally
speaking, recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege. 22 Justice Scalia
contended that the only proper question before the Court was whether there
should be a social worker-patient privilege.123 Further, Justice Scalia argued
that to frame the issue as the majority had was deceptive and countermanded
the Court's earlier decisions requiring it to proceed with caution when
developing new evidentiary privileges. 124
The dissent contended that there is no real evidence to support the
assertion that refusing to recognize the privilege would hinder effective
psychotherapy, as the majority suggested.'2 Justice Scalia thought it
unlikely that an individual will be deterred from seeking counseling merely
because he fears his conversations will be disclosed during litigation. 126
Even if the privilege were to exist, the effect it would have on encouraging
open communications is at best speculative, urged Justice Scalia. 27 While
Justice Scalia, with the majority, agreed that psychotherapy is indeed an
essential part of our society, he contended that relevant evidence, in order to
ascertain the truth at trial, outweighs that need.
28
In addition, Justice Scalia asserted that the disagreement among the
states as to the nature and scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege
indicates that this is a job for Congress rather than the courts. 29 He pointed
to the fact that several states have expressed many exceptions to the privi-
119. Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
120. Id.
121. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1933 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. Id.
123. laL
124. Id. at 1933-34.
125. Id. at 1934.
126. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1934.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1935-36.
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lege and that at least ten states have refused to recognize an evidentiary
privilege at all for a social worker.130 To the dissent, this lack of uniformity
suggests that experience with the privilege varies widely among the states.'
31
Justice Scalia pointed out that no state has adopted the psychotherapist-
patient privilege without restriction as the majority did here.132 Therefore,
according to Justice Scalia's dissent, the majority's reliance on the experi-
ence of state legislatures in adopting the privilege was inadequate.
33
Justice Scalia conceded that, theoretically, perhaps there should be a
privilege for social workers and their patients. 134 However, considering the
federal courts' authority under rule 501, and the presumption against
privileges in general, any need for an evidentiary privilege is outweighed by
the need for accurate truth finding at trial.1 35 There were fourteen amicus
briefs submitted on behalf of the defendants in this case.136 Most of those
briefs came from mental health organizations in support of confidential
communications between a mental health worker and her patient.' On the
other hand, there was not a single amicus in favor of the plaintiffs. 38
According to Justice Scalia, perhaps this is because "[t]here is no self-
interested organization out there devoted to pursuit of the truth in the federal
courts."' 
3 9
In closing, Justice Scalia expressed disenchantment with what he
believed was the Court's failure to live up to the expectation that it will
pursue truth, and as a result, Justice Scalia believes, federal courts will
become "tools of injustice.' '14°
E. Analysis of Jaffee v. Redmond
One would be hard pressed to find fault with the majority's view that
full, open, and honest disclosure by patients to mental health professionals is
crucial to effective therapy and recovery. 141 Unlike doctors, psychiatrists,
130. Id. at 1940.
131. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1936.
132. Id at 1940.
133. Id.
134. Il
135. Id.
136. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1940.
137. Id.
138. kIL
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1941.
141. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929.
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psychologists, and social workers do not rely heavily upon physiological
indicia to analyze a patient's problem or to determine an appropriate course
of therapy. While biological factors sometimes play a part in certain mental
illnesses like schizophrenia or depression, a tongue depressor in the mouth, a
stethoscope to the heart or a computerized axial tomography are not methods
of exploration primarily employed by mental health professionals. Rather, it
is largely talk-what the patient says-that provides the mental health
professional with the key that unlocks the door to the patient's particular
problems. When, out of fear of reprisal, the subject is highly motivated to
suppress information that would otherwise help to give a clear and accurate
picture to the therapist, the therapist is vastly impeded from providing
effective therapy. 142 According to a report of the Group for the Advance-
ment of Psychiatry, "'confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful
psychiatric treatment."' 43 It would be like a tailor trying to make a suit for
somebody without knowing all of the subject's measurements. Counseling
that is given in the wake of concealment of the facts or the provision of half
truths by the subject renders that counseling a product of ignorance. It is
axiomatic that a mentally sound populace is an absolute prerequisite to a
stable and productive society. 44 Therefore, given the plethora of mental
health problems, ranging from the serious to the extremely acute, that have
plagued Americans in recent times, 45 rules of law that profoundly impair
effective mental health treatment must be questioned and carefully scruti-
nized.
We probably will never know what Officer Redmond told her social
worker in the aftermath of a terrible tragedy wherein Officer Redmond was
the direct instrument of another human being's demise. We do know,
however, that most people in Officer Redmond's shoes who harbored even
the slightest degree of uncertainty as to whether some act or omission could
result in significant penal or pecuniary repercussions to them, would remain
silent as to those particulars. It may be that the act or omission in question
was completely justifiable from an objective standpoint, yet as the Jaffee
majority wisely noted, the fear of uncertainty that what patients say will
142. Id. See also Amicus Brief, Jaffee v. Redmond, No. 95-266, 1995 WL 767892 (U.S.
Dec. 29, 1995).
143. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928 (citations omitted).
144. See generally Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996); Jaffee v. Redmond, 51
F.3d 1346 (1995); Amicus Brief, Jaffee, (No. 95-266).
145. See GROUP FOR ADVANCEMENT OF PsYCHIATRY, REPORT 45, CONFIDENTIALITY AND
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 92 (1960).
1997]
15
Gunter: Jaffee v. Redmond: The Supreme Court Recognizes the Psychotherapi
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
come back to haunt them will cause them to remain mute or distort the
facts. 146 Therapy sessions would then often be relegated to exercises in
futility with the therapist flying blind and the subject deriving little or no
benefit since the root of the problem never comes to light. 47
Zeroing in on the situation of police officers in particular, the Jaffee
majority's line of reasoning is persuasive. Implicit in this reasoning is a
premise that few would challenge. That is, society needs to have its police
officers in a good state of mental health.1 48 In order to maintain this state of
mental health among these protectors of society, one must encourage them to
divulge each and every aspect of the particular stressful situation which led
to the need for counseling in the first place.' 49 Thus, one must not adhere to
rules of jurisprudence which will have a chilling effect upon complete
disclosure. From this point of departure, there is certainly no great leap in
logic involved in applying this reasoning to our citizenry as a whole. For
who would dispute that society is nothing more than a collective of individu-
als and that the mental health of these individuals determines, in turn, the
degree of stability of that society? The majority's logic in Jaffe is unassail-
able if one accepts the premise that complete candor to the therapist is
necessary to effective therapy.
However, there is at least one very vocal opponent to that premise,
namely Justice Scalia, whose dissent will be discussed.150 The central thesis
of Justice Scalia's dissent is weak on its face. His contention is that regard-
less of any benefit that may inure to society through recognition of a psy-
chotherapist-patient privilege, the "purchase price" of that benefit is too
high.' 5' What is this metaphorical "purchase price" to which Justice Scalia
refers? According to him, it is that of "occasional injustice.' 52 Not rampant
injustice, or even frequent injustice, but rather "occasional injustice." What
Justice Scalia must be referring to are those instances where the only proof
that one engaged in culpable conduct is his or her admission to a therapist
and where there is no separate and independent evidence of culpability. The
flaw in the dissent's approach, however, is that if no privilege is recognized,
the whole truth will not be disclosed to therapists during counseling.
146. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1928.
147. Id. (citations omitted).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1929.
150. Id. at 1932 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932.
152. d
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Therefore, justice will not be served anyway because therapists cannot
testify about that which they do not know. And certainly, if, in a given case,
there were to exist some independent evidence, the mere fact that a defen-
dant had made incriminating admissions to a therapist would not shield that
defendant from the inculpatory effect of such independent evidence. Thus,
with or without the privilege, in the vast majority of cases, the state or
plaintiff will have to prove the case without resort to the testimony of the
defendant's therapist. Moreover, "occasional injustice" is not an unduly
high price to pay for the benefit of maintaining solid mental health among
members of society. Only if one accepts the notion that professional therapy
is not an effective means of dealing with mental health problems can he buy
Justice Scalia's apparent assertion that the cost of recognizing a privilege
here is too high. In fact, it is Justice Scalia's position that a talk with "mon"
has more therapeutic value than professional counseling.153 No wonder that
to him instances of injustice for the few cannot be tolerated for the sake of
facilitating professional treatment for the many. Scalia contends that the
"average citizen," if questioned, would say that his mental health would be
more impaired if he were prevented from getting advice from his mother
than by being prevented from talking to a psychotherapist.1 54 The response
to this is, so what? Justice Scalia's assertion completely begs the question.
It is akin to saying: X is more valuable than Y; therefore, Y has little or no
value. Furthermore, people do not have to choose between their mother and
a therapist. Indeed, there may be a significant portion of the population
which would admit that, notwithstanding filial love and devotion, they were
actually driven into therapy by too much unsolicited advice from their
mothers!
Justice Scalia goes on to compare the psychotherapist-patient privilege
to the situation where evidence is excluded because a criminal defendant has
not been properly "Mirandized."' 155 In the latter situation that pontificates
Justice Scalia, "the victim of the injustice is always the impersonal State
[sic] or the "faceless 'public at large. ' 156 However, this is far from true.
Certainly, it is an extremely bitter pill for the family and friends of the victim
of a cold-blooded homicide to see the perpetrator "walk," simply because the
153. Id. at 1934.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1932. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. IsRAET, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 3.1 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the effects of the exclusionary rule in criminal
cases).
156. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932.
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police made a procedural mistake. The loved ones of the decedent must go
on each day haunted by the legacy of the private injustice which they have
suffered. These loved ones are far more the victims of this injustice than an
abstract "impersonal State" [sic] or "faceless public at large."' 57 These
victims have faces and they certainly have feelings. This is not to suggest
that Scalia is any great patron of the exclusionary rule and, true to his ultra-
conservative judicial philosophy, both the psychotherapist-patient privilege
and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination' 58 would be
unceremoniously dragged out to the chopping block if he had his druthers.
In the end, the price of perfect justice, as it would be in Justice Scalia's
grand design, could ultimately be nothing short of complete eradication of
constitutional protections for all defendants. The "purchase price" (to use
Justice Scalia's term) of this would be monumentally higher than the price of
"occasional injustice" about which he struts and frets. 59
Another main contention by the dissent is that even assuming that the
federal courts should somehow recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege,
communications to "social workers" should not be embraced within that
privilege. 60 Why does Justice Scalia feel that way? His answer is that
through the annals of history, we have "worked out [our] difficulties by
talking to, inter alios, parents, siblings, best friends and bartenders-none of
whom was awarded a privilege against testifying in court. '' 61 First of all, a
privilege is not an "award," it is a rule of evidence based on reason and
social policy reflecting the complex realities of contemporary society,'62 not
of some antiquated agrarian society. Second, even if a privilege were an
award, it is not the recipient of the information that is awarded the privilege;
rather, it is the communicator of the information who enjoys the benefit, and
by proxy, all members of society, who could someday find themselves
needing counseling just as Officer Redmond did in this case. Third, unlike
licensed social workers, bartenders, parents, and siblings are not profession-
als trained to deal with mental problems which are often complicated, acute
and deeply rooted. When one is thirsty and wants to relax, one does not go
to a social worker to mix a drink, just as they would not seek out a bartender
157. Id.
158. U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("No person shall... be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself .... ).
159. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932.
160. Id. at 1936.
161. Id. at 1934.
162. See generally McCORMICK, supra note 5, § 72 (discussing the purpose of eviden-
tiary privileges).
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to get their head on straight following some traumatic experience. Indeed, if
one chose the mixologist as their psychological mentor in lieu of a trained,
experienced professional, then one's judgment would be open to serious
question. And regarding one's mother, one doubts that a bowl of chicken
soup and a loving hug would provide more than a temporary fix to a prob-
lem.
Justice Scalia further contends that to broaden the psychotherapist-
patient privilege to include a social worker is like broadening the lawyer-
client privilege to include a "legal advisor." 163 While it is not clear what the
Justice means when he uses the term "legal advisor," he is implicitly
drawing an analogy-to wit, social workers are to psychotherapists as legal
advisors are to lawyers. This analogy cannot withstand even minimal,
logical scrutiny. Social workers are trained, tested, and then authorized by
the state through licensure to provide mental health therapy to people.
TM
Conversely, there is no such thing as a "legal advisor," other than an attor-
ney, in the eyes of the state. Only lawyers can give legal advice, and states
have statutes making it a crime for anyone other than a lawyer to dispense
legal advice. 65 Social workers are in the trenches. They often work with
children and the disadvantaged, those who cannot afford a high priced
"shrink" who takes notes and nods empathetically as the patient on the couch
spills his or her guts.' 66 Unlike Justice Scalia, one should not believe it is in
the spirit of rule 501, to exclude social workers from the ambit of a psycho-
therapist-patient privilege merely because the drafters of the rules specifi-
cally included psychologists and psychiatrists. 67 There is nothing in the
committee's recommendations excluding social workers. 68  Splitting
linguistic hairs serves no one. In substance, social workers are positive
forces in fostering the mental health of our people, arguably as much, or
even more so than psychiatrists and psychologists do. 169 Moreover, the
163. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1933.
164. Id. at 1931 n.16. See also AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF STATE SOCIAL WORK BOARDS,
SOCIAL WORK LAWS AND BOARD REGULATIONS: A COMPARISON STUDY 29 (1996).
165. See John F. Sutton Jr., Symposium, Unauthorized Practice of Law By Lawyers: A
Post-Seminar Reflection on "Ethics and the Multijurisdictional Practice of Law," 36 S. TEX.
L. REV. 1027, 1028 (1995) (stating that all 50 states regulate the practice of law in some
form).
166. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931.
167. Id. at 1932.
168. FED. R. EVID. 501. See Senate and House committees' notes following the rule, in
which there is no express language indicating a desire to exclude social workers from any
future adoption of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Id.
169. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931.
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Supreme Court was given the elasticity by Congress to recognize those
privileges which "experience" and "reason" show should be recognized.
170
The scientific evidence shows that in the last few decades the need for and
usefulness of social workers has increased dramatically, way beyond what it
was in 1972 when the committee drafted the proposals and recommenda-
tions.17 1 Therefore, in accordance with reason and experience, confidential
communications to social workers should not be excluded from the protec-
tion of the privilege. Instead, given the deluge of mental health services
provided by these, for the most part, dedicated professionals, experience has
taught us that there is every reason to extend the privilege to include them.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of Jaffee, there exists in the federal courts an eviden-
tiary privilege between a psychotherapist and her patient.172 More expan-
sively, Jaffee also means that the psychotherapist-patient privilege will
extend to social workers as well. 173 The privilege is not a qualified privilege
but an absolute privilege protecting all confidential communications between
a therapist and patient.1
74
What does this mean to the future of evidentiary privileges in the
federal court system? The Supreme Court made it clear that the contours of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege were to be developed by future courts
applying Jaffee to specific situations. 175 This statement paves the way for
future courts to chip away at the holding in Jaffee by creating exceptions and
limiting its scope. Conversely, it opens the door to even further broadening
of the privilege.
However, Justice Scalia seems to think that a "search for the truth"'176 is
such that everything must be uncovered and laid bare regardless of the cost
to privacy or mental health. This type of absolutist thinking is dangerous.
Where will this "search for the truth" end? If we speak of truth without
counterbalancing important societal interests like mental health, we can
170. See FED. R. EvID. 501, supra note 10; Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1932; see also Wolfle v.
United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934). The language incorporated in rule 501 was actually
borrowed from the majority opinion in Wolfle. See Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 12.
171. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1931 n.16.
172. Id. at 1932.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1940 (citations omitted).
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begin to justify more systematic incursions by our government. Ultimately,
our rationale of "search for the truth" could become irrational and irrecon-
cilable with democracy and reason. The direct result of this could be that at-
will, warrantless searches of citizens' houses and persons would become the
order of the day. The majority's view, vis-h-vis the dissent's here, is
somewhat of a line drawing game. It boils down to values, which are of
course, subjective. There may not be a "right" answer to the question of
whether a psychotherapist-patient privilege is a benefit worth the cost of
Scalia's "occasional injustice." Many different values have been repre-
sented by many different judicial compositions of the various Supreme
Courts throughout our history. However, Justice Scalia (along with Justice
Rehnquist who joined Justice Scalia's dissent in, part) is distinctly in the
minority among his colleagues, who have wisely allowed experience and
reason to prevail in Jaffee.
Jason L. Gunter
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